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According to a common misconception, Kant rejects rhetoric as worthy of 
no respect and neglects popularity as a dispensable accessory. Two recent 
publications on the communicative dimension of Kant’s conception and practice of 
philosophy represent a very solid rebuttal of such criticism. The books in question 
are Kant’s Philosophy of Communication by G. L. Ercolini and A linguagem em 
Kant. A linguagem de Kant edited by Monique Hulshof and Ubirajara Rancan de 
Azevedo Marques, especially in light of the long chapter “Kant e a Questão da 
Popularidade e da Linguagem da Filosofia” by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (pp. 17-
69). What Ercolini’s monograph and Santos’ chapter have in common, is that they 
both argue that Kant does indeed value and practice both rhetoric and popularity. 
However, they differ from each other in that Ercolini lets Kant’s reflection on 
popularity derive from occasional factors, while Santos locates its origin at the 
heart of Kant’s critical project. In order fully to appreciate their novelty, these two 
contributions call for an overview of the state of research on the subject of Kant’s 
conception of rhetoric. Thus, before closely examining them, I will briefly outline 
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Kant (a) as a skillful rhetorician, (b) as dismissive of rhetoric, and finally (c) as 
according rhetoric a moral function. 
As for those who acknowledge Kant’s rhetorical skills, John Christian 
Laursen, examining Kant’s use of the terms ‘private’ and ‘public’ in What is 
Enlightenment?, Toward Perpetual Peace, and Conflict of the Faculties, shows 
how Kant’s strategically subversive use of this vocabulary is an “important part of 
his political rhetoric” (Laursen, 1992, p. 194). 
In his monograph on Kant’s development as a philosopher and as a writer, 
Willi Goetschel stresses that the “rhetorical […] elements of the Kantian discourse 
operate as the conditions framing and constituting the text in which philosophy 
formulates itself” (Goetschel, 1994, p. 181). 
Volker Gerhardt reads Toward Perpetual Peace as displaying Kant’s 
“resources of literary rhetoric” (Gerhardt, 1995, p. 127) and points out that “the 
satirical form of the essay” is throughout infused with “the aspect of rhetoric” 
(ibid., p. 141). 
Michael Clarke maintains that “in both [What is Enlightenment? and 
Conflict of the Faculties] we see him [Kant] veil the fundamental justification of 
the public use of reason […] beneath highly rhetorical political appeals” (Clarke, 
1997, p. 55). 
Samuel McCormick examines Kant’s response to the royal rescript of 
October 1794 as a paradigmatic example of philosophy as rhetoric, i.e. of how 
philosophical writings become a mode of political discourse and action. 
McCormick depicts Kant as a philosopher preoccupied with the “rhetorical 
exigencies” (McCormick, 2005, p. 305) determined by the political context and 
able to adjust to the “shifting rhetorical landscape” (p. 316). In his view, Kant 
succeeds in showing that who really is at fault before the positive law is not the 
disobedient subject but the arbitrary king by masterfully deploying the rhetorical 
gambit known as “the rhetoric of humility” (p. 317). 
Analyzing Kant’s use of metaphors in the Critique of Pure Reason, Otfried 
Höffe emphasizes that “the claims of ‘sensibility’ are rehabilitated […] in the 
rhetorical-didactic context of striking images, comparisons and metaphors” (Höffe, 
2010, p. 381). 
On Jesús González Fisac’s view, What is Enlightenment? can be read as 
characterized by three intertwined types of paradox which the author terms 
anthropological, rhetorical, and anthropological-metaphysical. Kant’s rhetorical 
paradox consists in presenting two apparently contradicting terms and in showing 
that they actually are compatible. In the Enlightenment essay the terms in question 
are the scholar’s unrestricted freedom to make public use of his reason, i.e. “the 
true interest of the philosopher [and also] of the people”, and the public official’s 
duty to obey, i.e. “the interest of the prince” (González Fisac, 2005, p. 40). 
González Fisac argues that Kant’s rhetorical ability consists in championing 
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freedom of speech by both showing the compatibility of the two terms and 
skillfully applying all three kinds of paradox to one and the same argument.  
Writing on the same essay, Jay Foster contends that the essential point that 
Kant wishes to convey is that the prince should be content “to maintain civil order 
[…] by maintaining civil obedience” (Foster, 2015, p. 257). Similarly to González 
Fisac, Foster also frames the essay as a rhetorical piece and analyzes the dexterous 
“rhetorical strategy” (p. 241) informing it.  
Despite such appreciations of Kant’s use of rhetoric, there persists the image 
of a Kant uncompromisingly dismissive of rhetoric because of its epistemologically 
suspect and morally reprehensible nature. From the long story of such readings, I 
will limit myself to mentioning the more recent accounts. 
Drawing on Kant’s treatment of rhetoric in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, Robert Dostal concludes that Kant “forthrightly castigates rhetoric” 
because, in addition to losing the apologetic and protreptic function which had 
secured its place alongside philosophy in previous ages, it is manipulative, 
deceitful, and incapable of moving to moral actions (Dostal, 1980, p. 225).  
In a study about the Popularphilosophen, Johan van der Zande contends that 
Kant gives a major contribution toward “[b]anning the tainted business of rhetoric” 
from philosophy (van der Zande, 1995, p. 442) since, on Kant’s view, a rhetorically 
skillful presentation is “more an unnecessary concession to the public than the 
ultimate aim of philosophical discourse” (p. 439). 
In his monograph on the history of rhetoric, George Kennedy devotes to 
Kant only the following sentence: Kant “dismisses the art of rhetoric as worthy of 
no respect” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 275). 
In the 2001 Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, Kant even stands out in the history of 
rhetoric as the figure at whose hands “rhetoric [...] almost suffered its death blow” 
and who “condemned it outright” (p. 373) because of his alleged belief that “the 
reasoning, feelings, and values of audiences [are not to be] taken seriously as an 
agency for proper choice” (p. 428). 
In their volume on the historical and systematic relation between rhetoric 
and democracy, Benedetto Fontana, Cary Nederman, and Gary Remer maintain 
that on Kant’s view rhetoric results from the degeneration of reason’s coming into 
close contact with interest or appetite and add that “for Kant even Plato is not pure 
and rigorous enough, for he would use myth, allegory, and other rhetorical devices 
as means of mass persuasion and mass education” (Fontana/Nederman/Remer, 
2004, p. 10 fn).  
Finally, Don Paul Abbott compares Kant’s treatment of rhetoric with the 
1814 treatise on the same topic by the German protestant theologian Franz 
Theremin and argues that Theremin, seeing what Kant supposedly misses, believes 
that “the rhetor can affect persuasion while respecting individual autonomy” 
(Abbott, 2007, p. 282). He can do so “by appealing to the universal and 
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transcendent [sic!] ideas inherent in the minds of the auditors” (p. 282), these ideas 
being the Kantian couple of moral law and freedom. What Abbott presents as 
Theremin’s rebuttal to Kant in Kantian terms, is precisely what Scott Stroud sees as 
being the morally permissible and beneficial use of rhetoric which Kant himself 
offers especially in his account of the ethical community. With this, we are now in 
position to move to those who read Kant with a view to recovering the moral 
function of rhetoric. 
Pat Gehrke attempts to extract from Kant’s philosophy “a communication 
ethic that privileges community and recovers the value of rhetoric” (Gehrke, 2002, 
p. 2). He first argues that in Kant’s ethics the highest good is community and that 
community is constituted by the opposite poles of autonomy and love. He then 
concludes that “if one were to seek only to maximize rational autonomy, then one 
would not speak”, since speaking implies influencing others.  However, the 
opposite pole of love grounds the obligation to care for others and thus “requires 
first and foremost that we interact, that we speak” (p. 19) in a way that “is able 
simultaneously to hold forth our love for the other and to respect her or his 
autonomy in choosing” (p. 20).  
Without importing in Kant’s ethics the objectionable notion of community as 
the highest good or the fundamental ethical duty, Scott Stroud reconstructs a 
morally acceptable and even beneficial role of rhetoric from within Kant’s critical 
corpus. Stroud frames his argument by defining rhetoric as “the study of using 
language to affect what in modern parlance will be called illocutionary and 
perlocutionary results” (Stroud, 2005, p. 330). Perlocutionary acts constitute that 
kind of rhetoric that Kant rejects as manipulative since they aim at evoking a 
reaction without essentially involving rational agreement. In contrast, illocutionary 
acts effect a transferal of meaning by essentially relying on rational agreement and 
constitute a kind of rhetoric that Kant does not call by its name but nonetheless 
puts forth in his account of the ethical community. Accordingly, there is a force 
that rhetoric can exert in a way that is morally permissible and beneficial. The 
source of such force resides in the use of moral concepts accessible to all agents 
(transcendental freedom, respect, dignity) qua inherent to all agents. The public 
discourse enacted in the ethical community is entirely premised on such concepts 
and “draws on reason for its force, a force that stems from the individual’s own 
recognition of […] such concepts as derived from her own power of reason” (p. 
343). Stroud details his reconstruction of a possible moral use of rhetoric in Kant’s 
terms in his 2014 groundbreaking monograph Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric.  
Building upon Stroud’s work, Lars Leeten has most recently resumed the 
question of whether there can be something like Kantian eloquence, i.e. a rhetoric 
that exerts some kind of force which does not infringe upon Kant’s notion of 
epistemological and ethical autonomy. To this end, Leeten recalls Kant’s treatment 
of beauty as the symbol of the morally good and recovers rhetorical efficacy by 
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exclusively locating it in a speech’s beauty, “moral beauty thus being the only 
rhetorical force Kant allows” (Leeten, 2019, p. 79).  
Suggesting to read her monograph as a companion to Scott Stroud’s, in 
Kant’s Philosophy of Communication, G. L. Ercolini “examines Kant’s robust 
Enlightenment philosophy of communication” (p. 6). On her thesis, developed 
along the course of an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusive section, Kant’s 
quest for popularity becomes a rhetorical task which in turn results in Kant’s 
philosophy of communication as an integral part of Kant’s endeavor to foster his 
enlightenment project. In the Introduction, she significantly remarks that what 
seems to be Kant’s fundamental refusal of rhetoric does not stem from the mere 
fact that the rhetor exerts influence on the audience, but rather in the means that the 
rhetor employs to gain influence: Kant’s “objection has more to do with the means 
by which such influence is acquired” (p. 17). She also recalls the obvious fact that, 
whatever attitude Kant may exhibit toward rhetoric, he essentially treats rhetoric 
with respect to ethics, and outlines her anything but obvious reading that “the 
criteria by which he combines ethics and rhetoric […] show that the rejection is 
[not] wholesale” (p. 18). Convincingly substantiating these positions in the 
subsequent five chapters is Ercolini’s contribution to Kant scholarship and 
communications studies.  
In Chapter 1, Ercolini starts by pointing out that Kant differentiates between 
two sides to rhetoric. On the one side, there is rhetoric as the ‘machinery of 
persuasion’ (KU, AA 05: 327.28, p. 204)1 or ‘ars oratoria’ (KU, AA 05: 327.05, p. 
204) and, on the other, there is rhetoric as ‘merely skill in speaking (eloquence and 
style)’2 (KU, AA 05: 327.06, p. 204). Whereas the latter is the epistemologically 
suspect and morally impermissible rhetoric which Kant rejects, the former is the 
place to start to reconstruct “a Kantian account of what can be considered a 
positive role for rhetoric” (p. 34). As for the epistemological suspect, examining 
Kant’s treatments of persuasion and conviction in the Critique of Pure Reason and 
in the Blomberg Logic, Ercolini concludes that “a significant part of Kant’s 
suspicion about rhetoric’s potential misuse rests on the fact that the distinction 
between conviction and persuasion is admittedly indeterminate and fuzzy” (p. 36). 
Before recovering the moral quality of rhetoric in Chapter 5, Ercolini lays the 
groundwork for this crucial task by reconstructing Kant’s attitude toward 
popularity, drawing attention to Kant’s anthropological writings, and recalling 
Kant’s account of the free play of the faculties. 
 
1 “Maschinen der Überredung”, (KU, AA 05: 327.28). References to Kant’s works are to the Academy Edition 
with volume, page, and line number. References to The Critique of Pure Reason are to the pagination in the (A) 
and (B) editions. The number following the comma refers to the page number in the Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant. All emphases are Kant’s. 
2 “bloße Wohlredenheit (Eloquenz und Stil)” (KU, AA 05: 327.06). 
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In Chapter 2, she shows that Kant, far from theorizing and practicing a 
wholesale rejection of popularity, does struggle to popularize his philosophy and 
ends up producing his own philosophy of communication (p. 89). More precisely, 
she characterizes Kant’s conceptual and performative quest for popularity as 
Kant’s rhetorical task and frames it as the problem of how to convey philosophy so 
as to both preserve scholarly rigor and provide access to non-experts. Since the 
Prolegomena, so Ercolini, are an exercise in popularity, examining both their 
structure and how Kant accounts for it in the Appendix, one can stipulate the 
elements of ‘true popularity’ according to Kant. These consist in the four 
requirements of analytic exposition, simplified structure, focus on the main 
question, and knowledge of the world. Particularly noteworthy is Ercolini’s 
treatment of the first and fourth requirement through which she very clearly shows 
that what Kant rejects is not popularity per se but popularity how it is theorized and 
practiced by Popularphilosophen such as Christian Garve. As for the first 
requirement, an exposition is analytical insofar as the author’s point of departure is 
what plausibly constitutes common knowledge or experience. However, whereas 
common knowledge or experience (the scientific character of mathematics and 
physics as a matter of general consensus in the Prolegomena) should be the point 
of departure of the exposition, the expounded concepts shall previously be derived 
a priori with scholarly rigor (the conditions of scientific cognition as investigated 
in the Critique of Pure Reason). Thus, whereas true popularity requires that 
concepts be first derived from a priori grounds and then expounded on empirical 
grounds, false popularity recurs to experience to both expound and derive 
concepts. As for the fourth requirement, by ‘knowledge of the world’ Kant means 
the author’s knowledge of the audience’s taste, inclinations, and way of thinking. 
Here Ercolini stresses that Kant is not suggesting catering to an audience’s 
unreflected assumptions and transitory moods, which would constitute false 
popularity. Rather, he is assigning the philosopher the very demanding 
anthropological task of observing how that portion of humanity which makes up 
his potential audience processes concepts and gets moved to action. Thus, far from 
dismissing popularity, Kant theorizes and practices what he terms true popularity 
as an integral part of his critical project and, more precisely, to advance his own 
“view of the space of engagement, exchange, and furthering overall knowledge that 
comprises his vision of enlightenment” (p. 64). In light of this, Ercolini maintains 
that Kant’s derogatory utterances against rhetoric and popularity do not indicate a 
principled rejection of any of them. Rather, they are Kant’s “personal rejoinder” (p. 
86) to Garve’s conception of popularity in general and his review of the Critique of 
Pure Reason in particular. However, Kant’s ensuing reflection on and practice of 
popularity are not of an idiosyncratic nature. Rather, what starts as a personal 
quarrel, evolves into a philosophically coherent endeavor responding to an internal 
exigency of the critical project. 
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In Chapter 3, Ercolini shifts her focus on the Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View preparing the ample use that she will make of it in 
Chapter 5. She explains the relevance of this writing for her investigation by 
depicting the subject of the Anthropology as “irrevocably social”, as the realm 
“where communication plays a robust role [and] sufficient influence can be 
effected toward various purposes, without infringing upon another’s autonomy” (p. 
106). 
In Chapter 4, Ercolini turns to Kant’s critique of aesthetic judgment and 
devotes particular attention to Kant’s account of the interaction of the faculties. 
Recalling Kant’s account of the harmony of the faculties in their free play, she 
points out that not every interaction of the faculties results in a harmonious play. 
Rather, “the imagination has the power to overwhelm the understanding”. The 
possibility of an interaction in which the imagination unseats the understanding 
helps further elucidating Kant’s suspect toward rhetoric, since “rhetoric, in 
activating images of the imagination […] unleashes a […] force […] that can 
overwhelm the understanding” (p. 156).  
Reconstructing how Kant conceives of rhetoric with a view of striking a 
balance among the faculties is the subject of Chapter 5. This is a key chapter since 
Ercolini enriches the understanding of Kant’s concept of public use of reason with 
highly relevant distinctions (e.g. style vs. fashion; natural style as opposed to 
affected style and different from plane style), elucidations on mostly neglected and 
yet crucial topics (e.g. perfection in exposition), and treatments of underexamined 
topics (e.g. tone). One important distinction is the one of style and fashion. 
Accordingly, whereas fashion means “a type of prejudice […] where one does not 
exercise one’s own taste”, thus implicating heteronomy, style “involves a certain 
form of invention” (p. 178), thus requiring some measure of originality. Ercolini 
extracts from Kant’s philosophy a highly demanding notion of style, on which style 
requires the suitability of an exposition to both the author and the audience, and to 
both the subject and the context. Therefore, despite Kant’s talk of style as the mere 
clothing of scholarly rigorous concepts, Ercolini uncovers that, on Kant’s view, in 
a speech informed by moral concerns, if logical perfection gains the upper hand 
over aesthetic perfection, the speech’s style defeats the speech’s purpose (p. 174). 
On this topic, of particular interest is Ercolini’s elucidation of Kant’s notion of 
perfection in exposition, which she carries out on the backdrop of Kant’s account 
of the harmonious interaction of the faculties. A perfect exposition in Kant’s sense 
results from the balance of the two instances of logical and aesthetic perfection. 
These two kinds of perfection seem at first mutually exclusive, since logical 
perfection requires distinct but dry concepts, whereas aesthetic perfection requires 
lively but confuse concepts (p. 168). Nonetheless, contrary to the common 
conception, Kant does not limit himself to averring the primacy of logical 
perfection and to relegating aesthetic perfection to a dispensable accessory. Rather, 
Pasquare 
  Stud. Kantiana v.18, n.2 (ago. 2020): 109-119 
116 
he recognizes the latter the merit of presenting in concreto what the former 
presents in abstracto, thereby directing “our attention on things that might 
otherwise go unnoticed” (p. 169) and contributing something indispensable to 
cognition and its transferal. What is more, Kant’s reflections on striking the 
balance between two apparently mutually exclusive terms are the both 
epistemological and moral quest for the elusive perfection necessary to produce a 
harmonious interaction of the faculties and put it at the service of morality. Ercolini 
sees this summarized in the following passage (p. 170): “Wenn die gelehrte 
Erkenntnis zugleich schön ist, so ist sie die nützlichste und brauchbarste, besonders 
in der Praxis (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 66.34-35)”, where the harmony of the 
faculties of understanding, imagination, and reason is respectively referenced to by 
the terms ‘gelehrte Erkenntnis’, ‘schön’, and ‘Praxis’. In other words, philosophical 
writings must serve morality (which pertains to reason), but morality can only be 
served if the distinctness of the concepts (which pertains to the understanding) is 
appropriately conveyed by the liveliness of their exposition (which pertains to 
sensibility). 
Kant’s attention to language, rhetoric, and communication is also the subject 
of A linguagem em Kant. A linguagem de Kant edited by Monique Hulshof and 
Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques. The volume consists of an Introduction 
and fifteen chapters by international scholars and, as signaled by the title, features 
treatments of both Kant’s practice of philosophical exposition and reflections on 
language and communication. Chapters 1-9 concern Kant in particular, whereas 
Chapters 10-15 intertwine Kant’s reflections with those of contemporary or later 
thinkers. The first chapter, “Kant e a questão da popularidade e da linguagem da 
Filosofia” by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (p. 17-70) is a lengthy contribution toward 
rectifying the misconception of a Kant disengaged with popularity and 
uncompromisingly dismissive of rhetoric.  
Santos’ subject is the relation between critical and popular philosophy in 
light of their respective relation with school philosophy. His threefold objective 
consists in revaluing popular philosophy as a movement in its own right, 
underscoring the common purpose of critical and popular philosophy, and 
elucidating the terms of their respective dispute with school philosophy. His thesis 
is that Kant’s notion of ästhetische Behandlung as the desideratum of philosophical 
exposition comprises and surpasses mere popularity, thus giving reasons to 
recognize Kant the status of a popular philosopher (p. 20). The corollary is that 
with his critical philosophy Kant transforms both the philosophical approach to 
metaphysical questions and, as a byproduct, the relation between philosophy and 
language (p. 23).  
In his reconstruction of Kant’s notion of popularity, Santos differs from 
Ercolini in an important respect: whereas Ercolini reads Kant’s reflection on true 
and false popularity as ensuing from Kant’s quarrel with Garve, Santos locates its 
Towards a reassessment of Kant’s notion of rhetoric 
 Stud. Kantiana v.18, n.2 (ago. 2020): 109-119 117 
origin within Kant’s philosophy itself and qualifies the cause of popularity as an 
autochthonous concern traceable from the very beginning to the very program of 
the Critique of Pure Reason (p. 28). He substantiates this thesis by pointing out that 
Kant expresses concerns for popularity in two letters to Marcus Herz from 1779 
and 1781, hence predating both the publication of the first Critique and Kant’s 
contention with Garve. More decisively, Santos reads Kant’s treatment of 
ästhetische Deutlichkeit in the Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason (KrV, A XVII-XIX; p. 103-104) in a way that subverts its common 
interpretation. Whereas Kant is normally interpreted as establishing the primacy of 
scholarly rigor over popularity and vindicating the neglect of the latter, Santos 
reads him as explicitly reflecting on popularity and giving priority to scholarly 
rigor precisely with a view to making his Critique as reader-friendly as possible (p. 
48).  
In developing his argument, Santos examines in a complex and yet clear 
manner what Kant’s critical philosophy adopts from and rejects of both popular 
and school philosophy. Santos first substantiates that Kant shares with school and 
popular philosophy the requirement that philosophy be, respectively, grounded 
with rigor and committed to the world. He then highlights that Kant’s critical 
philosophy differs from school and popular philosophy in that it rejects, 
respectively, the empirical grounding of theoretical and practical cognition and the 
application of the mathematical method to philosophy. Finally, Santos summarizes 
the novelty of Kant’s critical philosophy as “a critique of the foundations of human 
representations with respect to the supreme objects of metaphysics, associated with 
an explicit architectonic or systematic intent of philosophy” (p. 31)3.    
Importantly, one of the implications of Kant’s conception and practice of 
philosophy is that the aforementioned worldly commitment of philosophy requires 
both popularity and scholarly rigor. Santos succeeds in substantiating his at first 
puzzling reading that popularity needs scholarly rigor precisely to stay worldly and 
concludes that, on Kant’s view, without drawing on solidly founded cognitions, 
popular philosophy risks becoming a pedantry which does not engage either the 
audience’s understanding or imagination (p. 44). After drawing from Kant’s 
published and unpublished reflections on communication, aesthetics, and 
popularity, Santos concludes that Kantian true popularity yields as a result an 
exposition which is thorough, as critical and school philosophy wants it and 
popular philosophy cannot achieve, and worldly, as critical and popular philosophy 
wants it and school philosophy cannot achieve. It does so when it becomes capable 
of fashioning and exposition which, by being both scholarly thorough and 
 
3 “Ora é precisamente a decisão de proceder a uma crítica dos fundamentos das representações humanas a respeito 
dos supremos objetos da metafísica, associada a uma explícita intenção arquitetónica ou sistemática do filosofar, o 
que fará a substancial diferença de Kant em relaçao aos filosófos ‘populares’ e a vários outros pensadores da sua 
época”. Santos, “Kant e a questão da popularidade” (p. 31). 
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generally communicable, is fertile for the understanding, emphatic for sensibility, 
and interesting for reason (p. 56). And this is also the task with which Kant entrusts 
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